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Articles
Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty
and Necessity of Public Inquiry
Bruce A. Green*
ABSTRACT
Prosecutors’ discretionary decisions have enormous impact
on individuals and communities.  Often, prosecutors exercise
their vast power and discretion in questionable ways.  This Arti-
cle argues that, to encourage prosecutors to use their power
wisely and not abusively, there is a need for more informed pub-
lic discussion of prosecutorial discretion, particularly with regard
to prosecutors’ discretionary decisions about whether to bring
criminal charges and which charges to bring.  But the Article also
highlights two reasons why informed public discussion is diffi-
cult—first, because public and professional expectations about
how prosecutors should use their power are vague; and, second,
because, particularly in individual cases, it is hard to know what
decision-making process the prosecutor employed and what con-
siderations entered into the prosecutor’s decision.  Despite these
challenges, the public can and should engage in more rigorous
scrutiny of prosecutors’ work.
By way of example, the Article identifies a questionable
practice that prosecutors have not adequately justified.  Some
prosecutors work with private debt collection agencies to
* Louis Stein Chair and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law.
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threaten to prosecute low-income debtors whose checks
bounced, demanding payment of the amounts owed plus addi-
tional fees, from which prosecutors’ offices receive a cut.  This
practice appears abusive both because some innocent debtors are
wrongly threatened with prosecution and because, for others, a
threatened prosecution is disproportionately harsh.  Because
prosecutors have not been subject to serious, informed public
questioning about potentially abusive practices such as this one,
they have not publicly justified the practice.  Informed public in-
quiry and discourse will both encourage prosecutors to use their
power wisely and promote accountability when prosecutors use
their power abusively.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a prosecutor’s job includes determining
whether someone committed a criminal offense and, if so, whether
to prosecute the offender.  The aim of criminal justice is not to pun-
ish everyone who commits a crime.1  Often, inflicting punishment
1. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940).  Then-Attorney General Jackson observed:
If the Department of Justice were to make even a pretense of reaching
every probable violation of federal law, ten times its present staff would
be inadequate. . . . What every prosecutor is practically required to do is
to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense
is most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most
certain.
Id.; see also Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“Paramount
among [the elements prosecutors consider] is a determination that a prosecution
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on offenders is unnecessary or excessive, or the criminal law’s
objectives can be accomplished less painfully.  In such instances,
among others, criminal punishment “would be socially unwise.”2
Prosecutors have discretion whether to file criminal charges and are
expected to exercise their discretion wisely.3
Fifty years ago, for example, prosecutors only selectively pros-
ecuted “bad check” cases—cases where customers purchased goods
with checks they knew were not backed by sufficient funds.4  Credi-
tors were “normally interested only in restitution for the loss suf-
fered by them” and were “seldom . . . willing to actually assist in
prosecution, even if restitution [were] not made.”5  Moreover,
someone who knowingly passed a bad check was not necessarily so
morally culpable or dangerous as to deserve being branded as a
criminal.  In some jurisdictions, the police or the prosecutor’s office
itself made an effort to encourage restitution.6  Although prosecu-
tors might have been uncomfortable serving as “collection agen-
cies,” some regarded this as a legitimate use of the criminal
will promote the ends of justice, instill respect for the law, and advance the cause
of ordered liberty.”); State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 78 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1952)
(“[I]n the everyday function of a prosecutor, he discards, or commences, or aban-
dons prosecutions, all in the exercise of his sound discretion. . . . [T]his discretion
must exist and be used if justice is to be administered.  Without it, the administra-
tion of justice would collapse.”).
2. FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT
WITH A CRIME 163–64 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1970).
3. There is a considerable, decades-long, and ever-expanding body of schol-
arly writing on prosecutors’ exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, In-
ternal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1971); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral
Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 513 (1993); Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation
of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive
and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016); Bruce A. Green &
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Inno-
cence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2001); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 105 (1994); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 851 (1995); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary Sys-
tem, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669 (1992); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as
an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bar-
gaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471 (1993); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521
(1981).
4. MILLER, supra note 2, at 164, 271–73.
5. Id. at 271.
6. Id.
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process.7  If restitution were not made, the prosecutor’s office then
decided whether to initiate criminal charges, based on the relevant
facts, such as whether the offender passed bad checks professionally
or habitually.8
Beginning over a decade ago, some local prosecutors began
handling bad check cases differently, so as to profit from these cases
while shifting the initial prosecutorial decision-making to private
debt collectors.  Hundreds of elected prosecutors across the country
cut deals with debt collection agencies, which were allowed to use
prosecutors’ official letterhead to threaten to prosecute and im-
prison consumers who issued checks on insufficient funds.  The con-
sumers were pressured not only to make restitution but also to pay
additional fees from which prosecutors’ offices would receive a cut.9
For example, one urban prosecutor’s “Bad Check Restitution
Program” sent an “official notice” to a customer whose bank re-
turned her check for $18.55.  The letter warned that a felony convic-
tion for issuing a worthless check is punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, but that the office “will not initiate
criminal proceedings” if, within the next ten days, the customer
paid $223.55 to cover the check and other expenses including the
cost of attending a required class in financial accountability.10  Pros-
ecutors and collection agencies have reportedly sent letters like this
to millions of people, many living in marginal circumstances and
some of whom are pressured through fear into forgoing meals or
medication to scrape together the amounts they believe must be
paid to avoid prison.11
One might ask whether the debt collectors are acting fairly.
Consumer advocates filed a civil lawsuit around a decade ago, but
litigation was forestalled in 2006, when, without debate, Congress
amended the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to protect the
7. Id.  In some jurisdictions, however, it may have been regarded as inappro-
priate for prosecutors to use their offices to assist private creditors. Cf. Okla. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Counsel, Op. 156 (1970) (“A county attorney is a quasi judicial officer
and he must be fair and impartial. . . . When he uses his office as a collection
agency he cannot be fair and impartial and represent the citizens of a state.”),
https://bit.ly/2HJYX6n [https://perma.cc/KG8M-VK2U].
8. MILLER, supra note 2, at 271–72.
9. See, e.g., Mosi Secret, Bounced Checks: How Local District Attorneys Get a
Cut of the Debt Collection Business, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 2, 2009), https://bit.ly/
2Sef28y [https://perma.cc/MF63-3UJR].
10. Letter from Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, Miami-Dade
Cty. State Attorney (Mar. 19, 2008), https://bit.ly/2GegpO3 [https://perma.cc/
5LBY-8446].
11. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A POUND OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZA-
TION OF PRIVATE DEBT 26–31, 56–59 (2018) [hereinafter ACLU], https://bit.ly/
2ENViTm [https://perma.cc/QG5W-EWCA]; Secret, supra note 9.
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debt-collection agencies.12  In 2015, the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau sued a California-based debt-collection company then
quickly settled the case when the company agreed to reform its
most abusive practices.  Among other things, the agreed-on reforms
included:  promising to work under prosecutors’ direction, not
sending letters unless the prosecutor found probable cause to be-
lieve the debtor had committed a crime, and not saying or implying
that the recipient will be prosecuted.13  More recently, the ACLU
publicly attacked the private debt collectors’ use of prosecutorial
authority as racially and economically unjust.14
One might also question the fairness of the prosecutors who
serve as the collection agencies’ co-venturers.  In 2014, the Ameri-
can Bar Association’s ethics committee raised concerns about the
deceptiveness of the practice.  The committee said it is impermissi-
bly deceitful under the rules of professional conduct for a prosecu-
tor’s office to let a debt collector use its official letterhead to
threaten prosecution unless a prosecutor has first reviewed the case
file to determine that a crime was committed and a prosecution is
warranted.15  Because its focus is on the professional conduct rules,
12. Secret, supra note 9.
13. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Con-
sumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nat’l Corr. Grp., No. 1:15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar.
30, 2015), https://bit.ly/2G0eQnN [https://perma.cc/YE34-73CR]; Stipulated Final
Judgment and Consent Order, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nat’l Corr. Grp., No.
1:15-cv-00899-RDB (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2015), https://bit.ly/2UBMcwm [https://perma
.cc/C8WU-2WJH].
14. See ACLU, supra note 11; Jennifer Turner, When Prosecutors and Debt
Collection Companies Become Business Partners, ACLU (Mar. 6, 2018), https://
bit.ly/2UzfbB3 [https://perma.cc/SP5P-WGAB]; see generally Eisha Jain, Capitaliz-
ing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018); Creola Johnson, Creditors’ Use
of Consumer Debt Criminalization Practices and Their Financial Abuse of Women,
34 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5 (2016); Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mer-
cenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175 (2014).
15. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 469
(2014); see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Misuse of Letterhead by Pros-
ecutors and Attorneys General, 30 CRIM. JUST. 48 (2016).  Private debt collectors’
use of prosecutors’ letterhead to collect private debt differs from the practice up-
held in Sheriff v. Gillie, 136 S. Ct. 1594 (2016), in which private debt collectors
sought to collect public debt on behalf of the state Attorney General, which had
statutory responsibility for collecting debt owed to the state.  Rejecting a lawsuit
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Court held that it was not mis-
leading or intimidating to use the Attorney General’s letterhead, in part, because
letters sent to debtors did not “imply that the Attorney General, as the State’s top
law enforcement official, intends to take punitive action against [debtors]. . . . Use
of the Attorney General’s letterhead merely clarifies that the debt is owed to the
State, and the Attorney General is the State’s debt collector.” Id. at 1603.  In
contrast, letters sent to consumer debtors by state prosecutors or on state prosecu-
tors’ letterhead are misleading or intimidating, in that they do imply or assert that
the prosecutors intend to take punitive action against consumer debtors, even
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the ABA opinion begs at least two questions.  First, given that pros-
ecutors do not routinely prosecute consumers who knowingly write
bad checks, when would a prosecution be “warranted”?  Second,
should prosecutors be collaborating with debt collectors in collect-
ing on unpaid checks?  Because these questions are not necessarily
answered by laws or professional conduct rules, they are questions
of prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutors have depicted the practice of sending letters
through debt-collection agencies as a “diversion program”—a
merciful alternative to imprisonment—on the pretense that recipi-
ents of the threatening letters are criminals who would otherwise be
prosecuted.16  But prosecutors have not disclosed the extent to
which they investigate and then determine that the letters’ recipi-
ents actually violated the criminal law and would be prosecuted if
they did not make restitution.  The routine and high-volume nature
of the practice, along with the evidently dominant role of the collec-
tion agencies, suggests that prosecutors have been simply selling
their letterheads, meaning that many recipients of threatening let-
ters are not in fact offenders.  For example, those who believed that
they had sufficient funds when they wrote their checks would not
be criminal offenders.  Nor is it clear how many actual offenders
would be prosecuted if they failed to make restitution.  And of
those who would actually be prosecuted, it is not clear how many
should be prosecuted.  If prosecutors have begun bringing charges
against one-time bad-check writers who would not have been
charged in the past, because the prosecutors now want to create a
genuine threat of prosecution for the sake of their profit-making
enterprise, the social wisdom of the prosecutor’s charging policy is
seriously debatable.
In a 2012 National Law Journal article, I asserted that the pros-
ecutors participating in this scheme are abusing their power,17 but
in the intervening years, public reaction to the practice has been
sporadic.  Consequently, prosecutors’ offices freely continue to
profit from the practice with little pressure to justify it to the public.
Perhaps the public is simply unsympathetic to consumers receiving
though prosecutors are not statutorily authorized to serve as the private creditors’
debt collectors.
16. See Secret, supra note 9 (quoting prosecutors).
17. Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors for Sale; The District Attorneys Selling Their
Letterhead to Debt-Collection Agencies Have Committed a Gross Abuse of Power,
35 NAT’L L.J., no. 5, Oct. 1, 2012, at 43.  This was a response to a New York Times
article describing the practice. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prosecutors, Debt
Collectors Find a Partner, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2D0aSau
[https://perma.cc/GV3U-5TWD].
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prosecutors’ threats, or perhaps there are too many more serious
injustices to occupy the public.  But an additional part of the prob-
lem may be that public discussion of prosecutorial discretion is diffi-
cult.  It is relatively easy to talk about prosecutors’ illegal conduct
because rules, statutes, and judicial decisions draw the relevant
lines.  However, it is hard to talk about prosecutors’ unwise use of
discretion both because there are no clear, accepted standards and
because prosecutors do not reveal how they make their discretion-
ary decisions.  This Article describes these problems but concludes
that public and professional discussion of prosecutorial discretion is
nonetheless essential to holding prosecutors accountable for how
they use their vast power.
By way of background, this Article begins in Part I with some
preliminary observations about prosecutorial discretion, which is
vast and pervasive.  This Article focuses, however, on prosecutors’
discretionary decisions about whether to bring criminal charges.
Part II identifies the public’s general expectations about how prose-
cutors should exercise charging discretion.  Part III shows that, al-
though these expectations are legitimate and that prosecutors
appear to endorse them, the public cannot easily hold prosecutors
accountable for badly or abusively exercising charging discretion,
both because of the vagueness of the applicable principles and be-
cause of the opacity of prosecutors’ decision-making.  Part IV
briefly observes that proposed solutions are inadequate, incom-
plete, or unattainable.  Finally, Part V concludes that prosecutorial
accountability requires, at minimum, robust public inquiry and con-
versation regarding prosecutors’ discretionary decisions.  Even
when relevant standards and facts relating to prosecutors’ decisions
may be uncertain, the public should question prosecutors’ doubtful
policies and practices.  Prosecutors’ role as debt collectors is one
example of where questions should be posed.  And the public
should hold prosecutors accountable when they fail to respond with
persuasive answers.
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
In the course of a criminal prosecution, prosecutors make all
the decisions on behalf of their client18—the “people,” the “state,”
18. Included here are lawyers authorized to serve as prosecutors in individual
cases, as in the case of lawyers who serve as special prosecutors when the prosecu-
tor’s office is disqualified because of a conflict of interest or who are appointed by
the court to prosecute contempt of court cases.
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the “government,” or the “commonwealth.”19  Crime victims may
express their preferences and may even have a legal right to weigh
in, but they are not clients.20  Nor are the police.21  Although prose-
cutors may take account of other stakeholders’ views, they make
the final call.22  Prosecutors make a vast array of decisions—
whether to seek an indictment or offer a plea bargain, whether to
hold a press conference, whether to make disclosures to the defense
that are more generous than the relevant laws require, what wit-
nesses to call and what arguments to make at trial, and so on.
Prosecutorial discretion pervades every aspect of prosecutors’
work.
Prosecutors are obligated to make and implement their deci-
sions within the bounds of the law, including constitutional law,
statutes, criminal procedure rules, and professional conduct rules.
Violating the law qualifies as prosecutorial “misconduct,” at least if
the prosecutor violates the law knowingly or intentionally.  One can
debate whether prosecutors’ unintentional violations of law should
be called misconduct or, as some prosecutors would prefer, mere
“errors.”23
19. On the identity and nature of the prosecutor’s “client,” see for example
Russell M. Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 GA. L. REV. 693, 695 (2017) (describ-
ing prosecutors as “‘clientless’ lawyers . . . whose clients are diffuse entities without
a decisionmaking structure” and who therefore “have to make decisions that
would be reserved to clients in other types of representation such as decisions
about the objectives of representation or whether to resolve a dispute without liti-
gation”); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of
Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 465 (2017) (“Prosecutors’ clients are sovereignties,
abstract public entities whose interests are hard to define.”); Irene Oritseweyinmi
Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. L. REV. 885, 895 (2018) (“The enti-
ties with the most potential to be considered the prosecutor’s client are the victim,
the police, the community, the defendant, and the law.  None of these options,
however, can clearly be defined as the prosecutor’s client.”).
20. A prosecutor has been sanctioned for ceding to a victim the decision
whether to enter into a plea bargain with the defendant. In re Flatt-Moore, 959
N.E.2d 241 (Ind. 2012); see Green & Levine, supra note 3, at 179–81.
21. This leaves aside low-level prosecutions which police or other law enforce-
ment officials have authority to conduct. See, e.g., Jeffryes v. Vance, 61 N.Y.S.3d
851 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (upholding Police Department attorneys’ prosecution of petty
crimes).
22. On the question of whether the President may direct federal prosecutors,
see Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department
of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018).
23. See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in
Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 401 n.21
(2011) (acknowledging an article calling for a distinction between prosecutors’ de-
liberate misconduct and their inadvertent errors, but questioning the legal signifi-
cance of such a distinction).
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Both the range of prosecutors’ discretionary decisions and the
breadth of their discretion in making those decisions are vast.  As
long as prosecutors act lawfully, their decisions are discretionary
and often unreviewable, meaning that their decisions are beyond
the courts’ power to overrule them.24  The legal limits placed on
prosecutors are not very restrictive and leave much to prosecutors’
judgment.  Moreover, prosecutors generally decide for themselves
both the processes by which they make discretionary decisions and
the grounds on which they make them.  Because the job of prose-
cuting in the United States is decentralized—conducted by multiple
prosecutors’ offices headed by elected or appointed prosecutors on
the federal, state, and local levels—there is no uniform approach to
exercising prosecutorial discretion.  There is no generally accepted
prosecutorial training or handbook on how prosecutors should use
their power.  Different offices have different procedures, which can
change when one chief prosecutor replaces another.25  Sometimes
different units in a given prosecutor’s office, or individual prosecu-
tors in a particular office, approach discretionary decisions differ-
ently—employing different criteria or different processes, and
reaching different outcomes, in similar cases.26
Although ultimate authority for discretionary decision-making
rests with a chief prosecutor, it would be impractical for chief prose-
cutors outside rural, one-lawyer offices to make all of the office’s
discretionary decisions.  The chief prosecutor may make or ratify
the most important decisions, but no chief prosecutor in an office of
any significant size can avoid delegating some important decisions
and many less important ones.  In large offices, chief prosecutors
24. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 837, 837–38 (“Few decisions prosecutors make are subject to legal re-
straints or judicial review.  Consequently, the key question for prosecutors ordina-
rily is not whether their decisions are lawless, in the sense that a court might
overturn them, but rather whether the decisions are wise or imprudent.” (citations
omitted)).
25. See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context:
Influences on Prosecutorial Disclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECI-
SION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269, 279 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012)
(“Organizations operating in the same field tend to converge on similar ways of
working . . . . Prosecutors’ offices are something of an exception, partly because of
their highly localized character.  Since they are not directly in competition for busi-
ness, the homogenizing pressures are much weaker.”).
26. See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3D, 102 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1152–53 (2012) (describing prosecutors’ autonomy, and in-
dependence from office leadership, in prosecutor’s office with nonhierarchical
structure); Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 25, at 281 (“Different understandings
[regarding disclosure to the defense] may develop in [a prosecutor’s] office or
among units that handle different types of cases based on differences among types
of cases.”).
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typically delegate significant responsibility to supervisory prosecu-
tors, but subordinate or “line” prosecutors (those on the front lines)
also make many decisions, both because some decisions have to be
made on the spot and because there are too many decisions for
supervisors to make them all.  Prosecutors can also make decisions
collectively.  Supervisors ratify the decisions of line prosecutors,
who are most familiar with the facts of the case, or line prosecutors
have input into decisions made by supervisors, who are presumably
most familiar with the office’s decision-making criteria and history
of decision-making.27
When scholars write about prosecutorial discretion, they usu-
ally focus on only the most important discretionary decisions, rarely
on all smaller discretionary decisions.  Many scholars focus exclu-
sively on decisions about whether to initiate criminal charges and
what charges to bring,28 while some scholars look at other big deci-
sions such as which investigative methods to employ,29 whether to
plea bargain and on what terms,30 or what sentences to seek upon
conviction.31  Increasingly, scholars are beginning to examine less
prominent aspects of prosecutorial discretion.32  But like others, I
will focus here on big discretionary decisions, and especially the
“charging” decision—that is, the decision whether to initiate crimi-
nal charges.
There are two fundamental understandings about the exercise
of prosecutors’ charging discretion in the United States.  The first,
which is fairly universal, is that prosecutors should not charge peo-
27. On the allocation of decision-making within a prosecutor’s office, see gen-
erally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008); Levine & Wright,
supra note 26.
28. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV.
1243 (2011); Gershman, supra note 3; Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92
GEO. L.J. 1133 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925,
942–49.
30. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016); Standen, supra note 3.
31. See, e.g., Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the
Federal Prosecutor’s Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 199 (1997); Lee, supra note 3.
32. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely
Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336 (2013) (addressing
prosecutorial discretion in filing amicus briefs); Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem
with Cyclical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Con-
viction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335 (2015) (addressing prosecutorial dis-
cretion post-conviction); Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?:
Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821 (2018) (ad-
dressing prosecutors’ use of discretion to support expungement applications).
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ple with crimes they did not commit.  The second is that people who
commit crimes should not necessarily be punished as harshly as the
law permits and should not necessarily be punished or prosecuted
at all.  The latter understanding is not shared by prosecutors in
every legal system,33 but it is shared to varying degrees by prosecu-
tors in other common law countries.34  This concept is especially
essential in the United States because legislatures tend to define
crimes broadly and in abundance with the expectation that prosecu-
tors will decide which cases deserve to be prosecuted.  Legislatures
limit prosecutors’ resources precisely because they want prosecu-
tors to make wise and humane choices.
In general, the prosecutor’s charging decision is not a binary
choice between prosecuting criminal charges or ignoring apparently
criminal conduct.  Courts, legislatures, and prosecutors themselves
have established informal and formal programs (such as “diversion
programs”) to offer further alternatives.35  In many jurisdictions, in
cases of minor crimes, prosecutors can enter into agreements pro-
viding that charges will not be brought or will be dismissed if the
accused person conforms to the terms of the agreement, which, at
minimum, may include not committing any further crimes over a
specified period of time.36  Prosecutors in many states can also initi-
ate certain proceedings in specialized courts that provide for alter-
natives to criminal prosecution or incarceration—for example, they
can bring certain drug cases to drug courts in which charges will not
33. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In
Europe, many countries adhere to what they aptly call the ‘legality principle’ by
requiring prosecutors to charge all prosecutable offenses.”).
34. See, e.g., United Kingdom Public Prosecution Service Annual Lecture on
Prosecutors’ Role (Oct. 23, 2009).  In a lecture given by Director of Public Prose-
cutions, the Director stated:
The grant to, and the exercise by, the public prosecutor of discretion is
essential in our system of criminal justice.  Whilst it may be superficially
attractive to declare that, where there is sufficient evidence, all crimes
should be prosecuted, a moment’s thought will demonstrate the bluntness
and unfairness of such an approach. . . . We, as a society, have rightly and
loudly trumpeted our ability to temper justice with mercy and compas-
sion, and it is through the exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion that we
give practical effect to this laudable objective.
Id.
35. See, e.g., State v. Hutson, No. M1999-00329-CCA-R9-CD, 2000 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 645 (Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2000) (finding no abuse of
prosecutorial discretion in denying defendant access to diversion program).
36. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution
Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295
(2013) (discussing use of deferred prosecution agreements with potential corporate
defendants).
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be filed, or will be dismissed, upon satisfactory completion of drug
treatment.37
When exercising discretion, prosecutors rarely, if ever, write on
a blank slate, pondering every decision as if for the first time.  Pros-
ecutors make decisions against the background of conventional pro-
fessional understandings—for example, the understanding that, all
things being equal, crimes that involve more serious harms (such as
homicide or arson) should receive priority over crimes involving
less serious harms, or that prosecutions of repeat offenders should
receive priority over prosecutions of first-time offenders.
Prosecutors also make decisions against the background of of-
fice-wide understandings.  These understandings may or may not be
made explicit, incorporated into written office policy, or made pub-
lic.  For example, some offices have an unwritten understanding
that, all things being equal, prosecutors should offer more lenient
plea deals to defendants who plead guilty earlier in the criminal
process as a reward and incentive for saving prosecutorial re-
sources.  Toward the same objective, other offices have formal poli-
cies, communicated to defense counsel at the outset of a case, that a
plea offer will be withdrawn if the defendant does not accept it by a
certain time.38
Some policies may be criticized as a misuse of power or as a
dereliction of duty on the theory that the prosecutor is contravening
the legislature’s intent and therefore acting undemocratically.  For
example, some prosecutors have been criticized for announcing that
they will never seek the death penalty.39  But even a decision not to
enforce a relatively trivial law can provoke controversy.  For exam-
ple, the Manhattan prosecutor has weathered some criticism for an-
nouncing that his office will no longer prosecute turnstile
jumping.40
37. See generally Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 783 (2008) (describing drug treatment court as a popular alternative to the
conventional war on drugs); Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2016) (exploring the broader effects of the drug court
movement).
38. See, e.g., Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargaining an Ethical Abuse
of Discretion? A Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 987,
991-93 (1995) (discussing Bronx prosecutor’s policy).
39. See Karl Racine et al., The Constitutional Crisis in Florida We’re All Miss-
ing, WASH. POST (July 12, 2017), https://wapo.st/2FznBht [https://perma.cc/7FC2-
DSRJ].
40. See Anthony M. DeStefano, De Blasio, NYPD Criticize DA’s Policy to
Not Prosecute Fare-Beaters, NEWSDAY (Feb. 7, 2018), https://bit.ly/2toVOPv
[https://perma.cc/UY32-E3BD].
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Many office policies are designed to promote consistent treat-
ment of similarly situated defendants.  For example, some urban
prosecutors’ offices have adopted policies identifying when drug of-
fenders will be eligible for diversion programs or will be charged
with particular offenses of varying levels of severity.  These policies
may turn on factors such as whether the individual is a drug user,
the amount of drugs involved, the extent to which the individual
profited or assumed a level of responsibility in a drug-dealing enter-
prise, or the individual’s prior offense record.  Furthermore, office
policies can serve other functions.  For example, some local prose-
cutors have publicly announced that they will no longer prosecute
people arrested for possessing small amounts of marijuana for their
own use.41  The policy reflects a view, which the chief prosecutor
seeks to communicate to the electorate, that marijuana use is not
sufficiently culpable or socially harmful to warrant a criminal
prosecution.
Prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are enormously important,
whether they are made by an office categorically or “wholesale” by
adopting policies for recurring situations, or they are made individ-
ually or “retail” by one or more prosecutors considering all the rel-
evant and available facts on an ad hoc basis.  These decisions matter
to individuals who may or may not be charged with a crime and to
their families.  And in the aggregate, decisions made by one or
more prosecutors’ offices matter to communities and groups be-
cause they influence whether people collectively feel safe and fairly
treated or, conversely, whether they feel abused by prosecution
practices that have led, in the view of many, to over-criminalization
and over-incarceration, particularly of people of color.
II. ABUSES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION—PUBLIC
EXPECTATIONS
Prosecutorial discretion has garnered increasing public atten-
tion and discussion as the public has come to understand both the
significance of prosecutorial discretion and, at times, its troubling
uses.42  Segments of the public often react when a prosecutor makes
a controversial decision such as by bringing charges that seem unde-
41. See Benjamin Mueller, Two District Attorneys May Stop Prosecuting Most
Marijuana Offenses, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2wJb8uZ [https://
perma.cc/3DLH-XRSS] (noting that Brooklyn and Manhattan prosecutors had
stopped prosecuting low-level marijuana offenses and were considering further re-
strictions on marijuana prosecutions).
42. See, e.g., Radley Balko, The Untouchables: Misbehaving Prosecutors, and
the System That Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/
2xgWvtF [https://perma.cc/2SN4-XHAT].
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served or by declining to pursue charges that seem to be warranted.
The public reactions reflect general expectations about how prose-
cutors should use their power—expectations that prosecutors often,
but do not invariably, share.43
One obvious public expectation is that prosecutors should not
prosecute innocent people.  Members of the public might question
a charging decision while a case is still ongoing because they think
the defendant is, or may be, innocent.44  But until the case has been
tried and the evidence presented, prosecutors typically can shrug
off such criticism as ill-informed.  Later in the process, however, the
public will likely have a firmer foundation for questioning a prose-
cutor’s initial charging decision, particularly when the prosecutor
drops the charges, the defendant is acquitted, or a conviction is
overturned following the disclosure of exonerating information,
which, though previously unknown to the defense, may have been
accessible to the prosecution.  At these points, one might ask
whether the charging decision was a prudent one given what prose-
cutors apparently knew when they brought the case.45
Over the last year or so, a number of high-profile stories have fostered
discussion and analysis of prosecutorial power, discretion and accounta-
bility. . . . Even many on the political right, traditionally a source of law-
and-order-minded support for prosecutors, have raised concerns about
‘overcriminalization’ and the corresponding power the trend has given
prosecutors.
Id.; see also Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 71 (2016).
[T]he public perception is growing that misconduct is not limited to un-
lawful conduct.  In particular, the public and the media are coming to
understand that prosecutors’ decisions about whom to charge, what plea
bargains to offer, or what sentences to pursue may be not simply unwise,
but abusive, reflecting wrongdoing in an ordinary, if not legal, sense.
Id.
43. Among the most controversial exercises of prosecutorial discretion in re-
cent years have been prosecutors’ decisions regarding whether to bring criminal
charges against police officers for violence against civilians. See, e.g., Blanche
Bong Cook, Biased and Broken Bodies of Proof: White Heteropatriarchy, the
Grand Jury Process, and Performance on Unarmed Black Flesh, 85 UMKC L.
REV. 567, 618–19 (2017).
44. A prominent example of where a prosecutor’s charging decision was
rightly questioned—and, indeed, the charges ended up being dismissed before
trial—was the Duke Lacrosse case.  For a discussion of the case, see Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Funda-
mental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prose-
cutors?, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 515, 527 (2016) (observing that convicted defen-
dant’s exoneration “suggests at least on the face of it that the prosecutor did not
act reasonably”); Susan Jones, Liberal Law Prof: Zimmerman Case ‘Should Never
Have Been Brought in the First Place’, CNS NEWS (July 15, 2013), https://bit.ly/
2DJGHWG [https://perma.cc/CN48-UBDE]; Huma Yasin, Noor Salman Should
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The public also understands that not everyone who commits a
crime should be charged and that prosecutors should choose fairly.
Sometimes, public concerns address the legitimacy of prosecutors’
selection criteria and prosecutors’ subjective motivations:  the pub-
lic asks whether prosecutors treated some people too harshly or too
leniently based on improper considerations.46  For example, prose-
cutors are sometimes suspected of engaging in favoritism when they
decline to bring charges against the wealthy, powerful, and well-
connected47 or against people with whom they have a personal or
professional relationship.48  Conversely, prosecutors are sometimes
suspected of bias—for example, of racial bias when they appear to
bring undeserved or unduly harsh charges against people of color or
when they appear to take cases less seriously in which people of
color are victims.49  Sometimes both favoritism and bias are thought
to be at play, such as when prosecutors have decided not to bring
Never Have Been Prosecuted in the First Place, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018), https:/
/wapo.st/2TiCPS8 [https://perma.cc/J2YR-7UAF].
46. Recent cases of police violence against civilians are examples of where
prosecutors have been accused of applying discretionary principles inconsistently,
out of bias or favoritism. See generally Cook, supra note 43; Kate Levine, How We
Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745 (2016); Caleb J. Robertson, Restoring Pub-
lic Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Policing Prosecutions When Prosecu-
tors Prosecute Police, 67 EMORY L.J. 853 (2018).
47. See, e.g., Melito & Adolfsen, Dismissal of Charges Against Former Vir-
ginia Governor McDonnell Is Another Lesson in Prosecutorial Discretion, JD
SUPRA (Sept. 12, 2016), https://bit.ly/2Sp0rqR [https://perma.cc/BJ4L-GK3G]; Stu-
art Diamond, The Law; Prosecutorial Discretion: Worthy of Defense?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1988, at B20 (discussing independent counsel’s decision not to bring
charges against President Reagan’s Attorney General, Edwin Meese); Charles
Toutant, Lawyers Fear Ray Rice Case Could Stymie Prosecutorial Discretion,
N.J.L.J. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://bit.ly/2BB1BFZ [https://perma.cc/4DAK-JTGP]
(discussing admission of NFL football player to pretrial intervention program in
lieu of criminal prosecution for domestic violence); The Judgment on DSK: A Les-
son in Prosecutorial Discretion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2011), https://on.wsj.com/
2SuiwnG [https://perma.cc/3895-QUFE] (discussing Manhattan District Attorney’s
dismissal of sex offense charges against Dominique Strauss-Kahn); Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecutorial Protection, MAL CONTENDS (Apr. 20, 2013), https://
bit.ly/2HRhZIm [https://perma.cc/9KYW-3PG7] (discussing decision not to bring
charges against then-county executive).
48. See, e.g., William Safire, When Top Prosecutor Misuses His Discretion, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 30, 1990, at 3B (accusing Attorney General of a
“double standard” in pursuing drug charges against the Washington, D.C. mayor
but not against his own subordinate).
49. See, e.g., Raj Jayadev, Justice Hinges for Trayvon Martin and America
Hinges upon Two Words: Prosecutorial Discretion, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 12,
2012), https://bayareane.ws/2Sbl8SU [https://perma.cc/A43R-LCLR]; see generally
Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Pro-
fessional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541 (2012); Yoav Sapir,
Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution
Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 127 (2003).
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charges against law enforcement officers for assaulting or killing ci-
vilians of color, even when publicly disclosed evidence suggests that
the officers were unjustified or engaged in excessive force.
Sometimes in making discretionary decisions, prosecutors are
suspected of relying on improper considerations, and these consid-
erations are not limited to suspect categories such as race, ethnicity,
religion, or gender.  For example, the public sometimes raises con-
cerns that chief prosecutors have been influenced by their self-in-
terest in reelection or in otherwise advancing their political career,
or that trial prosecutors have been influenced by their self-interest
in obtaining trial experience or in burnishing their reputations.50
Prosecutors are also suspected of engaging in deficient decision-
making processes—for example, allowing their evaluation of the
evidence to be distorted by their zeal to win cases.51
A related concern grows out of the understanding that prose-
cutors should not use their power arbitrarily and, therefore, simi-
larly situated people should be treated in roughly comparable ways.
If people who are equally culpable are treated differently for no
apparent legitimate reason, one might assume that prosecutors re-
lied on illegitimate considerations or that they simply acted arbi-
trarily.  Either way, the disparity offends the popular sense of
justice.  Although there is no consensus around how harshly or leni-
ently people should be treated in absolute terms in recurring situa-
tions,52 it is assumed that prosecutors’ standards should not shift
50. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Can the Baltimore Prosecutor Win Her Case,
ATLANTIC (May 6, 2015), https://bit.ly/2MHDFFB [https://perma.cc/WR8L-
NVZZ] (quoting law professor’s assertion that “[t]here’s good reason to think that
[the prosecutor] was driven by political considerations,” to overcharge in a case
involving an arrested person’s death in police custody, and “[w]hile that’s cause for
concern, it’s also absolutely typical in criminal cases involving defendants who
aren’t police”); see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 19, at 525 (“The line prosecu-
tor . . . is often motivated, at least in part, by professional goals, and the career
prosecutor’s political ambitions may well affect almost every important decision.”).
51. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America; ‘Sorry’ Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2001, at A25 (asserting, with respect to conviction of two innocent men based
on false testimony, that “[p]rosecutors tend to be far more interested in convic-
tions than justice”); see also Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resis-
tance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 137 (2004).
Taken together, [the] realities of life in the prosecutorial workplace—that
one’s “win” rate may be determinative of future success and that both the
individual prosecutor and the office as a whole have interests in maintain-
ing convictions—have arguably led to an organizational “conviction psy-
chology,” an environment where convictions are prized above all and the
minister of justice concept becomes a myth.
Id.
52. It has often been noted that punishment tends to be harsher in the United
States than in other Western countries. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of
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from case to case.  So, for example, prosecutors in death-penalty
states have been questioned about their decisions, individually or
collectively, to seek the death penalty when the decisions seem to
be made arbitrarily or on biased distinctions among different de-
fendants who are eligible for the death penalty.53  When defendants
are treated differently in different counties or districts in a state,
prosecutors might respond that different elected prosecutors have
different philosophies and each is elected to implement his or her
own philosophy.  When defendants appear to be treated differently
within a single jurisdiction, prosecutors might respond that the pub-
lic is unaware of, or indifferent to, salient distinctions among de-
fendants.  There may in fact be no salient distinctions, but it is
difficult to test this kind of response.
Another recurring public concern is more elusive.  It relates to
the understanding that prosecutors should use their power with a
sense of proportion.  This concern tends to be raised most often
when charging decisions appear to be overly harsh, that is, when the
potential penalty for the crime, or a prosecution itself, seems out of
proportion to the level of wrongdoing.54  For example, there has
been public debate about whether children should be prosecuted as
adults.55  Prosecutors have been accused of exercising bad judgment
or abusing their power in certain classes of cases—for example, by
Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 937 (2016) (“Starting in the 1970s and picking
up speed in the 1980s, America adopted more and more severe criminal penalties
as Europe adopted more and more mild ones, until today an enormous and star-
tling chasm has opened up between the two.”).
53. See, e.g., Frank Green, ‘Like They’re God’; Prosecutorial Discretion Called
Awesome Power, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 5, 1998, at A1; Michael
Kiefer, Pursuing the Death Penalty is Sole Discretion of Prosecutors, ARIZ. REP.,
Oct. 19, 2014, at A1; Death Penalty Study Panel Looks at ‘Prosecutorial Discre-
tion’, CITY PAPER, Oct. 16, 2007.
54. See, e.g., Libby Case Was a Questionable Use of Prosecutorial Discretion,
EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Mar. 12, 2007 (discussing an alternative perspective to the
decision to indict Lewis Libby); Lincoln Caplin, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial
Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2MHnbNB [https://perma.cc/
2X3Q-S6G4] (“[Prosecutors] go after defendants tooth and nail, overcharging
them from the abundance of criminal laws with sentences so severe and out of
proportion to the crime that, as now happens in 95 percent of criminal cases, the
prudent choice is to cop a plea.”).
55. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, More Teenagers Face Charges as Adults, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2000), https://lat.ms/2S8lr0Q [https://perma.cc/98W8-D3NW] (dis-
cussing the impact of Proposition 21 on charged teenagers in adult court); Melissa
Coretz Goemann, Virginia, Too, Allows Unfettered Discretion, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (Sept. 29, 2007), https://bit.ly/2GMqRga [https://perma.cc/MW97-EJ7L]
(“Virginia allows prosecutors unfettered discretion in certain types of cases to de-
termine whether to try a child as a juvenile or an adult. . . . [T]here is no oversight
or accountability over this process and no ability for any court to review the deci-
sions they make until after trial.”); ‘No Place for a Child’ Coalition Supports Bills
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prosecuting juveniles for engaging in consensual underage sex or
for sexting56 or by prosecuting women for neglect when they have
left children unattended.57  Sometimes prosecutors have been ac-
cused of going overboard by enforcing laws too strictly in individual
cases, without considering particular circumstances that make the
individual more sympathetic or less blameworthy than most.  For
example, some have criticized prosecutors for bringing firearms
charges carrying harsh penalties when defendants possessed guns
for legitimate reasons but mistakenly failed to complete the right
paperwork.58
III. WHY ABUSES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ARE HARD
TO DEFINE AND HARD TO DETECT
There is a spectrum between the very best and the very worst
uses of discretion, but there is no established vocabulary for judging
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion and for making salient distinc-
tions between the best, the good, the bad, and the worst.59  At one
end might be decisions considered to be truly wise.  At the other
That Would Limit Children Being Prosecuted as Adults in Florida, ACLU FLA.
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DNkqpP [https://perma.cc/3HF4-3VKZ].
56. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Minnesota Prosecutor Hits Teen with Porn Charges
for Taking Explicit Photos of Herself, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2t6uEfW [https://perma.cc/PU7M-ZPE8]; Travis Fain, James City County ‘Sexting’
Case Raises Many Legal Questions, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 12, 2014), https://bit.ly/
2X5Erkk [https://perma.cc/8S9R-FDK8].  For an argument that prosecutorial dis-
cretion should be narrowed in this context, see Eric S. Latzer, The Search for a
Sensible Sexting Solution: A Call for Legislative Action, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1039 (2011).
57. See Kim Brooks, Motherhood in the Age of Fear, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2LVlU4n [https://perma.cc/ZJ3F-YLQ9].
58. See, e.g., Chase Brush, Bramnick Urges Atlantic City Prosecutors to Use
Discretion in Shaneen Allen Case, OBSERVER (Sept. 16, 2014), https://bit.ly/
2B8KRWw [https://perma.cc/4JXQ-7ATZ] (discussing press conference at which a
New Jersey state assemblyman urged prosecutors to reduce charge, where woman
faced a mandatory three-year sentence for carrying an unregistered gun for which
she had obtained a concealed-weapon permit in the neighboring state); see also
Sam Roberts, Prison Isn’t as Mandatory as the State’s Gun Laws Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2tr9QjG [https://perma.cc/QR6X-69TR].
[I]n 2011, Bronx prosecutors did not seek the mandatory minimum in
cases involving a state prison guard who was not authorized to carry a
firearm only because he had failed to submit the required paperwork, and
a Pennsylvania school bus driver who was traveling to his sister-in-law’s
wake in New York.
Roberts, supra note 58.
59. See, e.g., George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good,
the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1058 (2005).
Discretion is inevitable.  Some of it is good.  Much of it comes from traits
of human nature that cannot be changed, what I have called mundane
discretion.  Some of it is bad because it is based on stereotypes about or
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extreme might be intentional illegality, such as knowingly indicting
someone in the absence of probable cause or intentionally treating
someone more harshly than others because of their race or religion.
What is in between?  One might distinguish the apparently wise or
prudent uses of discretion from those that seem to be debatable, the
merely debatable from the affirmatively unwise, and the unwise
uses of discretion from outright abuses of discretion that fall short
of illegality.  Surely, there are many more gradients.
When one talks about “prosecutorial misconduct” in the con-
text of prosecutorial discretion, it may not be clear into which cate-
gory the prosecutor’s decision falls.  Illegal conduct qualifies as
misconduct, of course.  This would include not only unconstitu-
tional uses of power (such as unconstitutionally discriminatory or
selective prosecution) but also uses of prosecutorial power that vio-
late statutory authority or professional conduct rules.60  If prosecu-
tors’ conduct is illegal, it falls outside the broad area in which
prosecutors might be said to have discretion.
One might argue for a broader definition of “misconduct” to
include exercises of power that, although not illegal, reflect abuses
of discretion.  But then we need an understanding of when discre-
tion is abused.  Some state courts have authority to review prosecu-
tors’ charging, plea bargaining, and/or nollei (dismissal) decisions—
for example, some state courts may dismiss charges “in the interest
of justice” or deny a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss charges after
they have been initiated.61  When a court blocks or overturns a
prosecutor’s decision, one cannot invariably infer that the court
found an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.  The court may simply
have reached a different judgment than the prosecutor about
whether a prosecution was in the interest of justice.  Some state
courts do have authority to make a finding that the prosecution
animus toward women, minority racial groups, and lower socioeconomic
classes.
Id.
60. Disciplinary actions against prosecutors for misusing their authority to ini-
tiate charges or plea bargain are infrequent and arguably should be increased. See
generally Green & Levine, supra note 3; Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of
Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2017).
61. See generally Samuel Becker, Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion
in the Decision Not to File a Complaint, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 749 (1988); Darryl
Brown, The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining, 46 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 63 (2017) (analyzing judicial authority and the role of judicial supervision);
Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1225 (2016) (comparing the current practice of prosecution-negotiated plea
bargaining to English courts’ practice of reviewing decisions); Green & Levine,
supra note 3.
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abused its discretion,62 which might be equated with prosecutorial
misconduct.  But, the case law on prosecutorial abuses of discretion
is sparse.  Federal courts and most state courts lack authority to
review prosecutors’ decisions under an abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard.  Many prosecutorial decisions that the public might fairly con-
sider to be bad or abusive are not remediable.
As discussed below in Part III.A, once one gets beyond the
blatantly illegal or legally abusive conduct, it is difficult to define
abuses or misuses of prosecutorial discretion because there is no
professional or public consensus on the applicable standards, other
than in the most vague and general sense.  Although judges occa-
sionally question the wisdom of prosecutors’ discretionary deci-
sions,63 there is nothing in the law, in judicial decisions, or
elsewhere to define whether an exercise of discretion is wise or un-
wise, and judges only rarely praise or criticize prosecutors’ decision-
making when prosecutors have unreviewable discretion.64
Moreover, as discussed in Part III.B, abuses and misuses of
prosecutorial discretion are hard to detect.  In general, prosecutors’
decisions should be judged based on the facts known or reasonably
available to them at the time they make their decisions and in light
of their internal decision-making processes.  But the public always
stands outside the decision-making process.  It is rare for the public
to know what the prosecutor knows, or knew, in making a decision,
and rarer still for the public to be privy to prosecutors’ thought
processes.  When prosecutors decide collectively through discus-
62. See, e.g., People v. Matulonis, 230 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
[T]he trial court, taking into consideration such factors as the offense
with which the defendant was charged, the surrounding factual circum-
stances, the lesser included offense of the plea bargain, and the opinions
of other interested parties, can refuse to accept a prosecutor’s recommen-
dation where it finds that the prosecuting attorney has abused his
prosecutorial discretion.
Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2013).
[A]ttention to balance and degree often distinguishes the wise exercise of
prosecutorial discretion from its opposite.  For now we leave to the reflec-
tion of the appropriate authorities whether it was necessary to throw the
full force of the law against this 19-year-old in a manner that would very
likely render his life beyond repair.
Id.
64. See, e.g., State v. Steckel, 708 A.2d 994, 1000 n.7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996).
[T]his case does not reflect any action by the prosecution to ‘stack’ aggra-
vating circumstances in an attempt to inappropriately influence either the
jury or the Court.  In fact, the State exhibited wise and prudent
prosecutorial discretion in only arguing for one aggravating circumstance
when the possibility existed for several others to also apply.
Id.
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sion, the discussion is not recorded.  When individual prosecutors
decide on their own, their reasons may not be verbalized and may
not even be fully expressed to themselves.
Without settled standards and established facts, everything
looks debatable.  Prosecutors can almost always argue that their
seemingly problematic decisions were legitimate.  Consequently, it
is hard for the public to hold prosecutors accountable for the qual-
ity of their discretionary decision-making or even to have well-in-
formed public discussions of the subject.
A. Definitional Problems
At the most general level, there may be broad agreement
about how prosecutors should make discretionary decisions.  But
the vague standards are not workable either for prosecutors making
decisions in individual cases or for those critiquing prosecutors’ de-
cision-making.
1. Addressing Doubts About Guilt and Evidentiary Reliability
There is broad agreement that prosecutors should not prose-
cute innocent people, but it is unclear how to translate this principle
into a standard of conduct.  Prosecutors do not always know
whether individuals are innocent or guilty.  They have no first-hand
knowledge.  They rely on testimony that is not necessarily accurate,
on confessions that are not invariably true, on forensic examina-
tions that are not always reliable, on inferences that are not always
conclusive, and so on.  They are rarely 100 percent certain.  There is
no consensus on how sure prosecutors must be of a person’s guilt
before initiating charges or bringing a case to trial.65  As a matter of
law, prosecutors may not proceed without probable cause,66 but
that does not answer how in the face of uncertainty, prosecutors
should exercise their discretion.  All would agree that prosecutors
should not proceed against those whom they know to be innocent,
but what if they believe someone may be innocent?  What if prose-
cutors have grave doubts about someone’s guilt or just nagging
doubts?
65. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 3 (arguing that prosecutors should be
“morally certain” of guilt before taking a case to trial); Green & Yaroshefsky,
supra note 3, at 497-501 (discussing alternative approaches).
66. See, e.g., Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1996); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 2005); cf.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (requiring
“probable cause” in order to bring a criminal prosecution).
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Likewise, there is no agreement on what prosecutors should do
to test the reliability of inculpatory evidence and testimony or to
seek out exculpatory evidence, and on when prosecutors should re-
frain from relying on evidence of questionable reliability.67  In gen-
eral, under the law, prosecutors may not offer evidence they know
or should know to be false and may not bury their heads in the
sand,68 but they have no legal obligation to probe the credibility of
their witnesses’ testimony or of other evidence.  However, that is
only the law.  It does not resolve how prosecutors should exercise
discretion.  Suppose prosecutors believe the defendant to be guilty
but have doubts about the reliability of some of the inculpatory evi-
dence—for example, about the credibility of a jailhouse informant
or of an accomplice witness or about the reliability of an eyewitness
identification or the efficacy of a forensic test.  May they use the
evidence knowing that, historically, many wrongful convictions
have been predicated on unreliable evidence that later turned out
to be false?
There is no professional or public consensus on how, as a mat-
ter of discretion, prosecutors should answer these questions.  Con-
sequently, when prosecutors bring charges against defendants
whose guilt is questionable or who turn out in hindsight to be inno-
cent, there is no agreement about the standard by which to judge
the prosecutors’ earlier decision to prosecute or their reliance on
false evidence in doing so.
In 2011, the Manhattan District Attorney publicized the stan-
dard that he employs in responding to doubts about guilt.  In mov-
ing to dismiss charges accusing the managing director of the
International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, of sexually
assaulting a hotel maid, the District Attorney wrote:
For generations, before determining whether a case should
proceed to trial, felony prosecutors in New York County have in-
sisted that they be personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
of the defendant’s guilt, and believe themselves able to prove that
guilt to a jury. . . . If, after careful assessment of the facts, the prose-
67. See Green, supra note 45, at 527 n.71 (arguing that existing ethics rules do
not adequately restrict prosecutors’ use of unreliable evidence, and citing other
authority addressing what standard should apply).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating
“[w]here the prosecution knew or should have known of [its witness’s] perjury, the
conviction must be set aside” if the false testimony may have affected the
outcome).
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cutor is not convinced that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, he or she must decline to proceed.69
This standard seems eminently reasonable, given the substan-
tial public interest in avoiding punishing the innocent.  But it is un-
certain how many prosecutors outside Manhattan concur.  Indeed,
it is uncertain whether this standard was communicated to Manhat-
tan prosecutors prior to the public filing in Strauss-Kahn’s case,
whether individual prosecutors in the Manhattan District Attor-
ney’s office have accepted and implemented it, and how the stan-
dard has been enforced.
2. Choosing Which Guilty People to Prosecute
There is broad professional consensus around other general
principles regarding prosecutorial discretion, relating to which cases
prosecutors should bring when they believe people to be guilty of a
crime.  For example, prosecutors generally agree that they should
not make arbitrary distinctions among cases—that is, similar cases
should be treated similarly.  But there is no consensus on what dis-
tinctions are or are not significant and how significant.
Some years ago, the Alabama Attorney General publicly bat-
tled the state district attorneys over this question in a murder case.
The killer, who was a juvenile, and his accomplice, who was a young
adult, were both initially convicted of capital murder, but the
killer’s sentence was changed to life imprisonment after the Su-
preme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional for crimes
committed by juveniles.  The district attorney who initially prose-
cuted the case then concluded that the accomplice should also be
spared execution given his lesser role in the crime, explaining that,
“out of plain fairness and simple equity in life, it’s not fair to leave
the person on death row who didn’t kill anyone and take the person
off death row who did.”70  The state Attorney General, who de-
fended the death sentence at the post-conviction stage, disagreed,
arguing that the sentence was appropriate and that, in maintaining
otherwise, the district attorney engaged in “a shocking, inexcusable
violation of his oath of office.”71  The state prosecutors’ association
defended the district attorney for “trying to ensure that similarly-
69. Recommendation for Dismissal at 4, People v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 02526/
2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 22, 2011), https://bit.ly/2BgKGZf [https://perma.cc/
2HQH-DEMZ].
70. Press Release, Ala. Dist. Attorneys Ass’n (Sept. 17, 2007) [hereinafter
Press Release], https://bit.ly/2GKHKrw [https://perma.cc/B7X8-LEYU].
71. Troy King, Ala. Attorney Gen., Statement (Sept. 17, 2007) (on file with
author).
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situated defendants are treated similarly.”72  But the Attorney Gen-
eral’s evident view that, as an adult, the accomplice was more
blameworthy and therefore more deserving of the death penalty
was arguably consistent with the idea of treating similarly situated
defendants the same, given the assumption that adults are more cul-
pable than juveniles for their offenses.
Even an individual prosecutor may waver on whether a consid-
eration serves as a legitimate basis for distinguishing among other-
wise similar cases.  For example, in a short newspaper interview
about prosecutorial discretion, a local Idaho prosecutor made
seemingly contradictory statements about whether defendants who
are similarly situated in other respects may be treated differently in
statutory rape cases when the victims have different preferences.73
His initial answer seemed to be “no”:
The purpose of prosecutorial discretion, is the idea that two
similarly situated individuals be treated similarly under the law—a
bedrock of our criminal justice system.  One example may be a stat-
utory rape case.  Assuming all facts such as ages, et cetera are con-
sistent, one victim may wish to pursue charges and a harsh sentence
and yet the other victim may not want charges filed.  Charges based
solely upon the wishes of the victim may lead to inequitable results
for similar cases.74
But a few sentences later, the prosecutor listed factors that his
office considers important in making charging decisions, which in-
cluded:  “What are the feelings of the victim?  The victim’s wishes
should play a key role in any charging decision.”75
In trying to determine whether prosecutors are making arbi-
trary or impermissible distinctions, yet another problem is that
there are so many considerations that may justify treating two
largely similar cases differently.  In making ad hoc determinations,
prosecutors may take account of differences in the nature of the
underlying criminal conduct, the individuals’ past criminal history,
and other characteristics relevant to the likelihood of rehabilitation
or recidivism, as well as the extent to which punishment will deter
others, the impact of punishment on the individual, and the impact
of a trial on witnesses.  Prosecutors may also consider a host of ad-
ministrative issues, including whether an individual cooperated
truthfully or pled guilty early in the process and the cost and diffi-
72. See King, supra note 71; Press Release, supra note 70.
73. Daniel R. Clark & Austin Allen, Prosecutorial Discretion Is Key to Justice
System, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, Sept. 9, 2016.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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culty of a trial.  Two cases may be alike, but no two cases are the
same.  And while it may be true that prosecutors take account of
the relevant considerations inconsistently from case to case, in ways
that reflect underlying biases of which they are not necessarily
aware, prosecutors can claim that they have taken account of all the
relevant factors and made relevant distinctions between cases that
are prosecuted differently.76
There is also an understanding, at the most general level, that
prosecutors should seek proportionate punishment, not the harsh-
est available punishment.  In other words, the punishment should fit
the crime.  But this is easier to express in theory than to implement
in practice.  To begin with, our plea bargaining system, which is the
predominant means by which criminal cases are resolved, presup-
poses disproportional punishment:  Depending on one’s perspec-
tive, either those who are convicted after trial are punished too
harshly, because they suffer a “trial penalty,” or those who accept a
plea offer are treated too leniently as an incentive for them to forgo
their trial rights.  The bygone premise that a guilty plea demon-
strates one’s contrition and potential for rehabilitation, justifying a
lesser punishment, does not explain the vast charging and sentenc-
ing disparities.
The decentralized nature of criminal prosecution is another
feature of the criminal justice process that makes proportionality, as
well as consistency, virtually impossible.  There is no national con-
sensus on how different cases should be treated, and the various
chief prosecutors invariably have different intuitions or philoso-
phies.  Some prosecutors may view drug use as primarily a criminal
problem while others may view it primarily as a mental health prob-
lem, resulting in disparities in charging.  Some may be more con-
cerned than others when the impact of charging decisions, however
justified in theory, falls disproportionately harshly on certain
groups depending on class and race.  For example, prosecutions of
pregnant women for drug use tend to be directed principally at low-
76. For example, federal tax prosecutors recognize that it is not a wise expen-
diture of resources to prosecute all tax evasion cases, but some cases should be
prosecuted to promote general deterrence.  The choice of which cases to prosecute
may have nothing to do with the seriousness of the tax crime or the tax violator’s
level of moral culpability but may turn on which cases have already commanded a
greater investment of investigative time, which are easier to prove, or which will
obtain more publicity.  While it is fair to regard these distinctions as salient, that
does not mean that they are employed in a consistent way.  The more factors enter
into decisions, the greater the opportunity for illegitimate considerations and un-
conscious biases to play a role.
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income women of color.77  In the end, what one might be tempted
to label an abuse of discretion may be, on reflection, the implemen-
tation of a contestable position on criminal justice policy.78
Further, there is broad agreement that certain considerations
are an improper basis on which to distinguish among otherwise sim-
ilar cases (and, in the case of race, religion, and gender, an unconsti-
tutional basis as well).  But, once one gets beyond the obvious
suspect classifications, there is no agreement on which considera-
tions are or are not legitimate.  For example, there is disagreement
on whether prosecutors may take account of a person’s immigration
status, and, if so, which way it cuts.79
There is also no agreement on what processes should be put in
place to prevent prosecutors from relying, if only unconsciously, on
impermissible considerations.  In recent years, there has been a
growing social science literature on unconscious racism and other
unconscious biases and a growing legal literature on how legal deci-
sions, including those of prosecutors, may be affected.80  But there
is no consensus on what, if any, processes should be implemented to
try to reduce the unconscious influence of illegitimate biases.  Nor
is there agreement on whether prosecutors may make distinctions,
based on facially nondiscriminatory rationales, that have a discrimi-
natory effect.81  For example, prosecutors could rationalize prose-
cuting street-level drug sales of crack more harshly than sales of
cocaine to wealthy brokers (think “Wolf of Wall Street”), based on
distinctions other than race and class.
77. See Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New
Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 873 (2014); Cortney E. Lollar,
Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J. 947 (2017); Dorothy E. Roberts, Unshack-
ling Black Motherhood, 95 MICH. L. REV. 938, 938 (1997).
78. See Bruce A. Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy—The Prosecutor’s
Role, 51 GA. L. REV. 1179, 1196–1200 (2017) (discussing the role of public policy
considerations in prosecutors’ charging decisions).
79. See Prosecutorial Discretion and Immigrants, BALT. SUN (May 1, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2BjRxkS [https://perma.cc/5UMC-CXQD] (supporting Baltimore
prosecutor’s policy of considering deportation consequences before charging law-
fully resident noncitizens with minor, nonviolent crimes); see also Green, supra
note 78, at 1197.
80. See, e.g., Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Pros-
ecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007); see also Bruce A. Green, Legal Dis-
course and Racial Justice: The Urge to Cry “Bias!”, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177,
180–81 (2015) (citing scholarship on the influence of implicit biases on
prosecutors).
81. See generally Carlos Berdejo, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in
Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018).
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B. Problems of Detection
Even insofar as there are standards by which to measure prose-
cutors’ discretionary decision-making, it is inordinately difficult to
apply those standards, not only for outsiders but for prosecutors
and their offices as well.
The ability to detect improper decision-making is most chal-
lenging for outsiders.  The full range of facts available to the prose-
cutor are almost never available to the public.  Nor are the office’s
internal deliberative processes or any individual prosecutor’s inter-
nal thought processes.  For example, when prosecutors go forward
with a case, outsiders cannot know whether the prosecutor scruti-
nized the evidence and made a fair judgment whether there was
reasonable doubt, or whether the prosecutor took illegitimate con-
siderations into account.  And when prosecutors decline to bring
charges or dismiss them based on insufficient evidence, they rarely
explain why, and if they do, the public will rarely have enough facts
to confirm prosecutors’ explanations or to determine whether they
were pretextual.
For example, the Manhattan District Attorney came under
challenge for his decision in 2015 not to bring charges against Har-
vey Weinstein for sexually assaulting an Italian model, based on the
inadequacy of the evidence; indeed, the Governor asked the state
Attorney General to investigate the prosecutor’s decision.82  But
the public does not know everything the District Attorney knew at
the time, what the prosecutors in the office discussed, or what they
thought but did not express aloud.  And assuming prosecutors de-
clined to proceed in the Weinstein case for exactly the right rea-
son—because of their own reasonable doubts—one might also
wonder whether this standard is applied consistently:  In cases in-
volving less powerful figures, do felony prosecutors scrutinize wit-
nesses’ credibility so closely and perceive doubts so readily?83
The public will have a rare opportunity to examine and critique
the Manhattan prosecutors’ exercise of discretion in another high-
profile case—the Central Park Five case, in which five young men
of color were convicted of raping a jogger in Central Park.  The key
82. See Vivian Wang & James C. McKinley Jr., Cuomo Orders a Review of
Vance’s Handling of Weinstein Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), http://
nyti.ms/2WjL9Tu [https://perma.cc/4PJR-XYEV].
83. See, e.g., JaneAnne Murray, A Perfect Prosecution: The People of the State
of New York v. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 371, 386 (2014)
(“[T]he prosecutorial procedures in the Strauss-Kahn case were exceptional.  The
case was treated like no other, and the prosecutors held themselves to standards
rarely seen in the hundreds of cases processed daily in the same courthouse.”).
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evidence was the young men’s confessions, which turned out to be
false:  Years later, the men were exonerated when an arrested sex
offender confessed to the assault and physical evidence corrobo-
rated his confession.84  The men’s exoneration does not in itself es-
tablish that the prosecutors proceeded despite reasonable doubts
about the defendants’ guilt, since the prosecutors’ charging decision
should be judged by what prosecutors knew, or reasonably should
have known, at the time of the prosecution.  But it will soon be
possible to consider prosecutors’ decisions in light of what they
knew.  Following the City’s settlement of the exonerated men’s civil
rights action, the City agreed to release evidence and files accumu-
lated by the police and prosecutors in the course of the investiga-
tion and prosecution.85  After-the-fact judgments may be fallible
because of the risk of hindsight bias and will be incomplete absent
knowledge of the prosecutors’ thought processes.  But files showing
what prosecutors knew when they made discretionary decisions
should give outsiders their best opportunity to assess whether and
how Manhattan prosecutors employed the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard, which the office says it has employed “for generations.”86
Likewise, it is rare to be able to assess whether prosecutors
made decisions based on illegitimate considerations, since prosecu-
tors rarely reveal their debatable reasoning.  Credit for trans-
parency should go to a local North Carolina prosecutor who
publicly discussed his prosecution of protesters who vandalized a
confederate monument.87  He was criticized for indicating that he
would take into account that the protestors had “no proper re-
course for asking our local government to remove or relocate this
monument,” and that “asking people to be patient and to let vari-
ous government institutions address injustice is sometimes asking
84. For a discussion of the case, see SARAH BURNS, THE CENTRAL PARK
FIVE: THE UNTOLD STORY BEHIND ONE OF NEW YORK CITY’S MOST INFAMOUS
CRIMES (2011).  For legal scholarship addressing the case, see Sharon L. Davies,
The Reality of False Confessions—Lessons of the Central Park Jogger, 30 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 220 (2006).
85. See Benjamin Lueller et al., City Releases Trove of Documents in Central
Park Jogger Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), http://nyti.ms/2B4lKEp [https://per
ma.cc/XT5F-5SWX].
86. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (quoting New York County Dis-
trict Attorney’s motion in the Strauss-Kahn case).
87. See Paul Mirengoff, Dunham D.A. Admits Ideology Will Influence His
Prosecutorial Discretion, POWERLINE (Aug. 21, 2017), https://bit.ly/2SnrQcM
[https://perma.cc/8BMU-2YMM].  For another example where a prosecutor pub-
licly acknowledged some sympathy for protestors who were criminally prosecuted,
see LARA BAZELON, RECTIFY 118–21 (2018) (discussing Alameda County prose-
cutor’s prosecution of Black Lives Matter protestors who chained themselves to
two Bay Area Rapid Transit trains).
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more than those who have been historically ignored, marginalized,
or harmed by the system can bear.”  The prosecutor may not have
meant to spark a public debate on whether the protestors’ motiva-
tion was a legitimate basis for leniency or whether taking account of
it disrespected the equality principle—that similar cases should be
treated similarly.  But the prosecutor’s disclosure of his thinking
(assuming the disclosure is candid) provides a rare window into the
exercise of discretion.  It gives the public a chance to debate
whether the considerations he identified are legitimate ones.  To the
extent the debate is inconclusive, the public may develop a better
appreciation of the complex, subjective, and contingent nature of
prosecutors’ discretionary decision-making.
Incomplete information is not a problem only for outsiders.  In
prosecutors’ offices, it may be hard for the chief prosecutor or su-
pervisory prosecutors to know how prosecutors other than them-
selves are making decisions.  To the extent that prosecutors make
decisions unilaterally, they may never have reason to disclose their
thought processes, and when prosecutors make decisions collec-
tively or require approval, their actual thought processes may not
be fully disclosed.
Prosecutors may not even be candid with themselves.  Deci-
sion-making is often impressionistic.  Prosecutors may never verbal-
ize their reasons, and may never acknowledge even to themselves
everything that goes into their decisions.  Even if prosecutors are
committed to principled decision-making, they may be influenced
by illegitimate considerations of which they are at best dimly
aware.88
For example, once defendants have been charged, it becomes
harder for prosecutors to weed out cases where there is insufficient
evidence.  Prosecutions acquire a momentum that makes it hard for
prosecutors to see evidence objectively.  If a case is brought by po-
lice or other investigators, there will be a tendency to rely on the
investigators’ judgment, because the investigators are closer to the
evidence, they are often more experienced, prosecutors want to
maintain good relations with them, or for other reasons.  Once a
88. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and
Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475 (2006); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1587 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006); Barbara O’Brien,
A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incen-
tives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV
999 (2009); Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commen-
tary on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315 (2003).
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prosecutor makes an initial decision to proceed, it is hard to recon-
sider because of the difficulty of acknowledging error, the time and
effort sunk into the case, and the tendency to review new informa-
tion in light of one’s preexisting assumptions about the case.  On
top of that, dismissing a case may be viewed as an implicit conces-
sion of error and may carry reputational risk within the prosecutor’s
office or, especially in a high-profile case, publicly.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH SOLUTIONS
In a famous speech to federal prosecutors, then-Attorney Gen-
eral (later Supreme Court Justice) Robert Jackson acknowledged
prosecutors’ immense power and the possibility for them to do im-
mense harm by abusing it.89  His answer to this problem was, essen-
tially, to select prosecutors of good character.90  It was an important
speech but an inadequate solution.  Prosecutors of good character
who endeavor to exercise discretion wisely need an understanding
of the difference between a wise decision and an unwise one.  They
need to know which considerations are legitimate and illegitimate
and how to avoid unconscious as well as conscious reliance on ille-
gitimate ones.  Not all lawyers of good character have the good
judgment to exercise discretion well.  And, of course, there is no
process to ensure that only lawyers of good character and good
judgment become prosecutors.
Some suggest that what is needed is a different prosecutorial
ethos.  Although prosecutors have traditionally been told that they
have a duty to “seek justice,”91 many consider this injunction too
vague to have any influence.92  Alafair Burke has argued that pros-
ecutors should adopt an attitude of vigilant agnosticism regarding
89. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 3 (“The prosecutor has more control over
life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America.”).
90. Id.
Because of this immense power to strike at citizens . . . with all the force
of government itself, the post of Federal District Attorney from the very
beginning has been safeguarded by presidential appointment, requiring
confirmation . . . . You are thus required to win an expression of confi-
dence in your character by both the legislative and executive branches
. . . .
Id.
91. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous Prosecutor as Minister of
Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecu-
tors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Daniel S. Medwed, The
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Con-
viction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009).
92. See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of
Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301 (1996).
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defendants’ guilt,93 and Eric Fish recently suggested that prosecu-
tors should adopt an attitude more like that of judges in inquisito-
rial legal systems.94  Others agree that prosecutors should be more
objective and less adversarial at least in certain phases of their
work—for example, in making charging decisions or in reviewing
new exculpatory evidence following a conviction.  To prevent pros-
ecutors from being over-adversarial, some favor dividing prosecu-
tors’ charging and trial functions between different prosecutors or
different offices, with those making the charging decisions adopting
a more judicial, less adversarial, mindset.95  Likewise, it may be
helpful to assign post-conviction review to a new set of prosecutors
who lack the cognitive biases of the trial lawyers who secured the
conviction.96  Compartmentalizing or re-structuring prosecution in
this manner might improve discretionary decision-making in some
respects, but it would not fully address all problems.  Specifically, it
would not address situations where, after charges are brought,
doubts about guilt are raised while prosecutors are preparing wit-
nesses to testify or acquiring new evidence.  Nor would it address
all of the improper considerations and disparities that might be pre-
sent in prosecutors’ decisions.
Others have sought other ways to restructure decision-making
to reduce abuses of discretion.  All involve tradeoffs.  For example,
both categorical and ad hoc decision-making processes have their
advantages and limitations.  Office policies may reduce the risk that
different prosecutors will treat similar cases differently and that
prosecutors will rely on illegitimate considerations.  But policies
pose a risk that individual circumstances will not be given individual
weight that is deserved.  There may be considerations not reflected
in office policies justifying why one person may be less deserving of
prosecution or punishment than another who fits the same profile—
considerations making the person less culpable, less dangerous, less
likely to recidivate, or one for whom prison would be unusually
harsh.  Strict adherence to policy may exclude legitimate considera-
tions.  For example, DOJ policy, developed under Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft, regarding charging decisions under the sentencing
93. See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79
(2010).
94. See Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419,
1451 (2018) (arguing that prosecutors should not act as “partisan advocates”).
95. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prose-
cutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 897 (2009); H.
Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Pas-
sionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1704 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 3.
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guidelines were, in the view of some, too rigid, leading to exces-
sively harsh punishment.97
There may also be advantages and disadvantages to making de-
cision-making more centralized—for example, by consolidating re-
sponsibility for prosecution in a single state authority.98  An entity
with broader authority could apply uniform standards and
processes for exercising prosecutorial discretion, thereby reducing
disparities.  But centralization is no panacea.  In the absence of
transparency, there would be no assurance that internal standards
would be applied consistently.99  And, given debatable philoso-
phies, a central authority might broadly apply unfavorable stan-
dards.  Decentralization affords more opportunity for experimen-
tation, leadership, change, cross-pollination, and conversation
among prosecutors of different jurisdictions.  Decentralization also
promotes legitimate regional distinctions that reflect different social
conditions, different public preferences, or different philosophical
approaches.
One might change internal decision-making processes in other
ways.  Some legal academics have suggested that, essentially in
common law fashion, prosecutors should develop an internal juris-
prudence of prosecutorial discretion:  articulating the reasons for
certain decisions, identifying principles on which their decisions are
based and which their decisions exemplify, and employing prior de-
cisions as exemplars for future decision-making, at least insofar as
97. See, e.g., Hearing to Examine the Prosecution of Ignacio Ramos and Jose
Compean: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology & Homeland
Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (hearing into
whether federal prosecutors’ charging discretion was unduly limited by DOJ
charging policy which led to sentences exceeding ten years’ imprisonment for two
convicted Border Patrol Agents); Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Attorneys Required to
Seek Maximum Sentence, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at A13; Jonathan Turley,
Under Ashcroft, Justice Is Blind and Handcuffed, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2003),
https://lat.ms/2B6Jtn8 [https://perma.cc/4KUM-WKCH].
98. Cf. Jackson, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing that “some measure of central-
ized control is necessary” in federal prosecution for various reasons, including to
avoid different interpretations or applications of the criminal law and to promote
uniform criminal justice policy).
99. See, e.g., Andy Ho, Balancing the Prosecution; Publishing Prosecutorial
Guidelines Will Improve Transparency and Respect for Law, STRAITS TIMES, May
6, 2013.  The article discusses apparent disparities in prosecutions in Singapore,
pointing to the example of drug possession cases where some defendants were
charged with amounts calling for the death penalty and others who appeared to be
similarly situated were charged less harshly. Id. The article observes that although
prosecutors follow internal written guidelines, they have not disclosed the guide-
lines, leading many in the public to find the charging differences “hard to accept.”
Id.
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they stand the test of time.100  Further, some difficult decisions
should be made collectively by prosecutors, articulating to each
other the facts and reasoning on which their decisions are based.101
This would increase the likelihood that decisions are thoughtful,
justified by accepted decision-making criteria, and unaffected by il-
legitimate considerations.  It would also serve as a better process to
acculturate junior prosecutors than the ad hoc and haphazard
means employed in many prosecutors’ offices.  However, many
prosecutors would predictably resist this idea, seeing an elaborate,
documented decision-making process as an unnecessary waste of
limited resources.
Still other legal academics have focused on mechanisms of
public accountability.  Some suggest expanding judicial review of
prosecutors’ discretionary decisions102 or disciplinary regulation of
these decisions.103  In effect, this would narrow the range of
prosecutorial discretion, allowing courts more of a role in articulat-
ing impermissible standards and processes.  But it would do nothing
to address unwise or even abusive exercises of discretion that fall
beyond the reach of the courts and disciplinary authorities.
Others have advocated for greater transparency in how prose-
cutors make decisions.104  Greater transparency would allow voters
and the public media to respond in a better-informed way to both
laudable and questionable decision-making.  But there are myriad
barriers to substantially increased transparency, including the need
to respect witnesses’ privacy and protect them from obstruction, the
need to protect uncharged people from embarrassment, and the
need to avoid disclosures that will prejudice the legal process.  In-
deed, prosecutors have been criticized for explaining decisions not
to initiate or continue prosecutors, at least where the explanations
place uncharged or unprosecuted individuals in a negative light.105
100. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 19, at 515–35.
101. Id. at 529–31.
102. See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The
Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37 (1983).
103. See Green & Levine, supra note 3, at 182; Levine, supra note 60.
104. See, e.g., Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86
WASH. L. REV. 69, 110 (2011); Chris Chambers Goodman et al., Unpredictable
Doom and Lethal Injustice: An Argument for Greater Transparency in Death Pen-
alty Decisions, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 997, 1034 (2009).
105. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF
VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 239–49 (2018), https://
bit.ly/2LQk7Nu [https://perma.cc/5F32-E7FB].  Perhaps the most notable recent
example involved James Comey’s public explanation, prior to the 2016 presidential
election, of his decision not to indict Hillary Clinton for communicating classified
information over a private email server. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 34  3-MAY-19 12:48
622 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:589
Public accountability is essential, and prosecutors could safely dis-
close much more to the public about how they make decisions in
general, in order to facilitate public understanding and critique.
But prosecutors can rarely be expected to provide significant detail
about their decision-making in individual cases.106
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR PUBLIC INQUIRY AND
DISCOURSE
It is important for the public to engage in informed discussion
of the work of all public officials, including prosecutors.  And there
is no more important aspect of prosecutors’ work than how they
exercise discretion.  Therefore, the public should scrutinize prose-
cutors’ decision-making and endeavor to hold prosecutors account-
able when they make decisions badly or abusively.  The public
cannot rely on courts to perform this function.  Courts have
processes to address many situations where prosecutors act ille-
gally, but courts cannot hold prosecutors accountable for exercising
discretion unwisely.
This Article has identified some of the challenges facing the
public in overseeing and critiquing prosecutors’ exercise of discre-
tion.  These include the lack of settled decision-making standards,
the inaccessibility of facts on which prosecutors base their decisions,
and the inaccessibility of prosecutors’ decision-making processes in
individual cases and in general.  All of these present obstacles to
the public’s ability to make definite judgments in many situations.
However, it does not follow that the public should simply assume
that prosecutors are exercising power wisely.  At the very least, the
public can raise questions about prosecutors’ decision-making and
try to hold prosecutors accountable for not offering convincing
answers.
Consider, for example, the prosecutorial practice with which
this Article began:  prosecutors’ collaboration with private debt-col-
lection agencies to target consumers who write bad checks, threat-
ening them with criminal prosecution if they do not pay both the
amount of the bad check and an additional fee, to be divided with
106. The Strauss-Kahn case, discussed above, is the rare one in which a prose-
cutor has a legitimate vehicle to explain a discretionary decision. See supra note 69
and accompanying text.  In that case, the prosecution required the court’s permis-
sion to dismiss pending criminal charges, and, although the court undoubtedly
would have granted a barebones motion filed by the prosecution with the defen-
dant’s asset, the prosecutor was able to provide a lengthy explanation for the deci-
sion, in which the public undoubtedly had a keen interest. See Recommendation
for Dismissal, supra note 69.
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the prosecutor’s office.  This practice raises a host of questions
about whether prosecutors are exercising discretion wisely or abu-
sively, and the public should demand answers.
From a broad public policy perspective, there is a question of
whether individuals with limited means who are swept into the
criminal justice system ought to be required to contribute to the
state’s and private vendors’ costs, including not only prosecution
costs but the costs of ancillary social services.  This is a big, current,
pervasive question, and it arises in many jurisdictions in different
ways.107  In the bad-check scenario, customers are required not only
to make good on their bad checks, but to pay a fee toward the cost
of collection and toward the cost of a class in financial responsibility
which may or may not be useful.  In another iteration, people ar-
rested for marijuana possession have been charged hefty fees for
the cost of drug education classes and drug testing.108  States have
also imposed court costs and counsel fees on criminal defendants,
including those meeting indigency standards.109  These sorts of fees,
the payment of which is induced by threats of imprisonment, are
highly regressive—imposing the cost of public services on those
who can least afford them and who may not actually need or benefit
from the services.  The motivation for the arrangement is suspect,
insofar as private companies running the programs are the financial
beneficiaries, and even more so insofar as prosecutors’ offices are
the beneficiaries.  Looking at the big picture, a threshold question is
whether placing financial demands on people who write bad checks,
presumably because they have limited financial resources, is wise
public policy.  A related question is whether prosecutors’ judgment
about the wisdom, fairness, and utility of this policy is distorted by
prosecutors’ institutional interest in sharing in the proceeds.
One might also ask whether prosecutors’ implementation of
this collections program, in tandem with private agencies, results in
individual injustices.  Prosecutors may have little or no role in se-
lecting who receives a letter on their letterhead.  While some recipi-
ents may be subject to prosecution and deserving of prosecution if
they do not make restitution, it is fair to assume that many will not
107. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES
AGAINST LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL IMPLICATIONS 19 (2017), https://bit.ly/2TwwXEQ [https://perma.cc/3FCV-
7CQX].
108. See Shaila Dewan, Caught with Pot? Get-Out-of-Jail Program Comes
with a $950 Catch, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2C28cKH [https://
perma.cc/TT37-BZG9].
109. See J.D. King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2019).
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be because they did not know that their bank account balances
were too low when they wrote the checks and therefore did not
commit a crime at all, or because the incident is so aberrational
and/or the amount of money in question is so small that prosecutors
would never use their limited resources to prosecute such a case.
Prosecutors apparently are not conducting investigations before the
letters are sent under their name.  And private debt collectors do
not necessarily have an incentive to conduct thorough investiga-
tions, even assuming they are tasked with doing so.110  Is it fair to
threaten those who have not, or may not have, broken the law—
where the prosecutor has not conducted an adequate investigation
to ascertain whether the person is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt?111
Those whom prosecutors have unfairly or idly threatened with
prosecution for writing bad checks are misled, are caused needless
anxiety, and are pressured to make payments that they have no ob-
ligation to make.  The prosecutor’s threat to bring criminal charges
is not as personally devastating as actually being charged.  But the
threat alone invokes anxiety.  It is an exercise of power that should
be justifiable.112  If prosecutors are making idle threats, unjustified
by prosecutors’ examination of the evidence, why is that a legiti-
mate exercise of discretion?
And in cases where the threats turn out to be sincere, because
prosecutors lawfully could and in fact would bring charges if restitu-
tion were not made, is that intended exercise of charging power
wise or abusive?  One question is whether it offends the propor-
tionality principle—that is, whether it is an excessive use of state
power to bring criminal charges and seek criminal punishment
when a consumer knowingly writes a bad check.  Another is
whether it offends the equality principle—whether similarly situ-
110. With regard to the general problem of delegating prosecutorial authority
to private actors, see Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution
Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411 (2009).
111. See Green, supra note 17, at 43.
[N]ot everyone who bounces a check is a potential criminal.  Most proba-
bly are not.  Writing a bad check may be a crime if the person writing the
check knew she had insufficient funds in her bank account and intended
to defraud the vendor.  But many people write bad checks innocently.
Before threatening to bring charges, a prosecutor must review the evi-
dence and conclude that there would be a fair basis for bringing charges.
Otherwise, the threat is baseless and unjustified.
Id.
112. Cf. Jackson, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing that prosecutor’s “tremen-
dous” discretion includes the power to investigate citizens “to the tune of . . .
veiled or unveiled intimations” and to order arrests and present cases to the grand
jury as well as to cause citizens to be indicted and held for trial).
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ated individuals who commit other financial or property crimes of
equally small magnitude are being prosecuted.  One might suspect
that prosecuting bad checks is often an excessive response, out of
proportion with how similar crimes are handled, and that the rea-
son for treating these cases differently is that private agencies are
willing to do most of the work and to provide prosecutors’ offices
part of the proceeds.  If so, the further question is whether this is a
legitimate basis for treating these cases differently, given that the
distinctions are irrelevant to the offenders’ level of moral culpabil-
ity, to the public interests in deterrence and rehabilitation of of-
fenders, or to any other traditional purpose of criminal
punishment.113
Perhaps prosecutors have good answers to these questions.
But prosecutors have not offered answers because they have not
been subject to serious, informed public questioning.  To say that
prosecutors have discretion generally means that they do not have
to answer to the courts, but it does not mean they do not have to
answer to the public.  The public has a responsibility to ask ques-
tions, drawing on informed understandings about the legitimate and
illegitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  Informed public
inquiry and discourse will both encourage prosecutors to use their
power wisely and promote accountability when prosecutors use
their power abusively.
113. See Green, supra note 17, at 43.
If some bad check writers are occasionally to be prosecuted or
threatened, the decision should be based on legitimate factors such as the
amount of the check or whether the debtors are repeat offenders, not on
the willingness of a particular creditor or collection agency to help fund
the prosecutor’s work.
Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK302.txt unknown Seq: 38  3-MAY-19 12:48
***
